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A call to resist illegitimate authority

February 1985

The Philippine
Opposition Movement
ERIK GUYOT

0

ver the past year, the Philippines
has joined the ranks of countries where
an entrenched dictatorship is rapidly
being challenged by a broad-based opposition movement. After 13 years of
almost virtual one man rule, the Philippine political arena is being swept by
new winds of change. In the cities, tens
of thousands of demonstrators regularly overflow the streets to be dispersed
only by water cannon and gunfire. In
the countryside, a strong guerilla movement has called certain areas "off
limits'' to the Philippine military.
Officials both in Manila and Washington see the days of the Marcos government as numbered - some say at
the outside 18 months. The question
has become not who among the prominent political personalities in the Philippines will supplant Marcos, but what
form of economic and political system
will replace the current regime. There is
a growing sense - of hope in the
Philippines, apprehension in Washington - that a post-Marcos government
will be broad-based, nationalist in program, democratic in action, and committed to genuine land reform.
Thirteen Years of One Man Rule
The Marcos government's rule since
1965 set in motion the social forces

which are now enacted in the urban
demonstrations and rural resistance.
Before the Marcos era, Philippine
politics was generally characterized by
the maneuvering for power among a
relatively small group of elite politicians. Family and personai ties formed
the basis for power alignments while
the inability of any one faction to consolidate power for long was reflected in

a string of one term Presidents. Politics
was often an avenue for building private largesse. Senate President Jose
Avelino candidly summed up the unwritten rules of the period thus: "If you
cannot permit abuses you must at least
tolerate them. What are we in power
for? We are not hypocrites. Why

Continued on page Two
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should we pretend we are saints when in effectively dismantled the business and
upperclass' major power base in the
reality we are not?"
The Marcos era changed that system National Assembly, their future ability
of alternating rule by various factions to mount sustained opposition was
of the pro-U .S. elite. Soon after his severely limited. Second, the massive
election in 1965, Marcos began to in- crackdown and establishment of the
stitutionalize the role of a new actor in military as a major political force conpolitics which would guarantee his con- vinced many of the student, peasant
tinued position: the military. Through and worker leaders that parlimentary
the expansion and integration of the maneuverings alone could not dislodge
military into ''economic development'' the Marcos regime.
Marcos was ultimately able to transform the military into a power base
This deepening immiswhich only he controlled.
In the early 1970s a growing na- eration has given the Philtionalist movement demanding eco- ippines the distinction of
nomic sovereignty and the removal of
U.S. military bases began to make its having the second lowest
presence felt both in the courts and in daily food consumption rate
the streets. Marcos responded swiftly to
in Asia, lower than Banglathis challenge by declaring Martial Law
on September 21, 1972. The Philippine desh. It also created a social
Congress was abolished, the press was powderkeg waiting to
muzzled, and within a few weeks over
explode.
30,000 people were jailed. Speaking at a
rally in front of the White House on the
The imposition of Martial Law and
twelfth anniversary of Martial Law,
former Senator Jose Diokno firmly laid the subsequent militarization were the
responsibility at the U.S. doorstep: logical outcome of the model of eco''Faced with a resurgent nationalism nomic development practiced in the
which demanded that all foreign bases Philippines. Export-oriented growth
be removed, the U.S. government, and ''development from above'' beMarcos, and the elite decided that be- came the overriding policy. Under the
fore the organized strength of the peo- guidance of the IMF and its sister instiple equalled the strength of their rhetor- tution the World Bank, the Philippine
economy was geared even more
ic, Martial Law was necessary.''
By declaring Martial Law Marcos ef- towards exporting a few agricultural
fectively positioned himself as sole products such as coconut, pineapple,
guarantor of the U.S. military bases, sugar, and banana as well as the prothereby insuring his position vis a vis duction of light goods by foreign
the U.S. while consolidating his power multinationals. To attract multinaover the domestic opposition. During tionals, low wages, "labor discipline,"
the early years of Martial Law, Marcos and currency devaluation were necestransformed the military into an effec- sary. In addition, the entire Philippine
tive power base expanding it fourfold economy was bound even tighter to the
from a modest size of 60,000 to over fluctuations of the world commodities
240,000 personnel. Direct U.S. military market. 2
Along with this form of economic
aid was crucial to this process jumping
from $10 million for the twenty year development, Marcos introduced the
period prior to Martial Law to $170 present system of concentrating ecomillion for the first five years of Mar- nomic wealth in the hands of a few loytial Law. Moreover, with U.S. advice alists, which presently carries the epiand training, an extensive national thet "crony capitalism." Under crony
security system was firmly established. capitalism, Marcos expropriated comU.S. advisors applying their experience mercial holdings from certain businesfrom Saigon helped set up the secret in- ses and transferred them to personal
telligence agency NISA as well as the friends and the military. The coconut
industry, which one out of every four
crowd control unit METROCOM. 1
This consolidation of power through Filipinos depends upon and is the
the military rather than the traditional largest foreign exchange earner, is the
parliamentary methods brought about prime example. The industry was extwo conditions. First, since Marcos had panded and brought under the control
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of a complex web of coconut mills,
credit associations exclusively for large
plantations, and export boards. At the
bottom of the pyramid, the vast majority of day laborers or tenants receive
from one-third to one-fourth of their
crop worth approximately $200 per
year. Perched on top are Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the
"coconut king" Eduardo Cojuangco.
In the sugar industry, controlled by
sugar baron Roberto Benidicto, the top
7% of the landlords own 46% of the
land, while over half of the landowners
are relegated to 9% of the land. The expansion of these vast plantations continues to be carried out at the expense
of small landowners who are displaced
through debt mortgaging or military
means; Peaceful attempts by farmers to
organize and retain their land are
systematically cut short by the Philippine military.
In the cities, the government has
created export processing zones where
it guarantees low wages and no strikes
for foreign multinationals. The "success'' of this policy is reflected in the
declining wage rates: from 1972 to 1978
wages for skilled workers dropped
25 CT/o, unskilled 30%. This deepening
immiseration has given the Philippines
the distinction of having the second
lowest daily food consumption rate in
Asia, lower than Bangladesh. It also
created a social powderkeg waiting to
explode.
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With the international recession in
1979, the model of development from
above began to come apart at the
seams. Foreign markets for Philippine
exports shrunk. The first world erected
protectionist barriers against Philippine products throwing more employees out of work. And the massive
foreign borrowing needed to lubricate
the system began to ratchet the Philippine foreign debt up to precarious new
levels. One tremor and the house of
cards was likely to collapse.
The Opposition

The assassination of Senator
Benigno Aquino on August 21, 1983
triggered off capital flight of massive
proportions. In the months following
the assassination hard currency fled as
the Philippine financial elite apprehensively watched the growing demonstrations. This near abandonment of Marcos by Philippine business prompted
U.S. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth to
later chide that the staggering Philippine foreign debt of $25 billion could be
slashed if Philippine investors recalled
the $10 billion they had salted away
overseas.
For many in the Philippine middle
and business classes, the assassination
marked the most significant in a long
series of · political killings by the
military, stripping away whatever
legitimacy the Marcos regime may have
had. For the first time, many in the
middle class took to the streets in protest with some two million people joining Aquino's funeral procession. Since
the Fall protests, a myriad of old and
new organizations have composed the
opposition. Ranging from traditional,
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elite-oriented politicians intent primarily on replacing Marcos, to issued oriented organizations calling for extensive economic and social change, the
opposition falls into three broad
categories.
The so-called traditional opposition
is comprised primarily of older politicians from the Martial Law and preMartial Law era. Most prominent
among them are Salvador Laurel, a
former Senator in Marcos' ruling party
and Senator Eva Estrada Kalaw of the
liberal party. Due to their pro-U.S.
stance and acceptance of the U.S. military bases, the State Department has
been assiduously cultivating this group
as a replacement for Marcos. Under the
banner of the UNIDO coalition, the
elite opposition seeks "national reconciliation" or powersharing with Marcos in some form. Their economic
policies are basically similar to the current Marcos austerity measures and
reflect their powerbase among big
business.
The second major grouping is comprised of traditional politicians with a
strong commitment to national. sovereignty and social reforms. Prominent
among the liberal democrats are former
Senator and noted human rights activist Jose Diokno and Agapito "Butz"
Aquino, younger brother of Benigno
Aquino. Drawing their support
primarily from professional and the urban middle classes, they refuse power
sharing with Marcos and call for the
removal of all U.S. military bases.
In contrast, the popular opposition is
comprised less of political personalities
and more of mass based, issue oriented
organizations. Alexander Padilla,
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General Secretary of the Nationalist
Alliance, a broad coalition which spans
the liberal democrats and the left,
described the cooperation between the
two thus, " ... all the people's
organizations, clandestine or open, are
all in the process of dismantling the dictatorship and they are learning to cooperate with each other, work with each
other, and support each other."
The major organization on the left is
the National Democratic Front (NDF),
an illegal, broad-based coaltion encompassing most sectors of Philippine
society: workers, peasants, women, national minorities, clergy, students, and
professionals. Drawing its strength
from these sectors supporting it, the
NDF is recognized as the best-organized and most potent opposition force
in the Philippines. Its twelve point pro-

In

the first quarter of
1984, some 950,000 workers were laid off due to the
debt crisis. Unemployment
has now reached 40% while
inflation has climbed
past 65%.
gram, which reflects both the specific
interests of the various sectors and their
common unity, calls for the dismantling of the Marcos dictatorship and
U.S. control, and reestablishment of
democratic rights, genuine land reform, and self-determination for national minorities.
Two important members of the NDF
are the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), founded in 1968, and its
armed wing, the New People's Army
(NP A). The CPP and the NP A, along
with the Christians for National
Liberation and the Kabataang Makabayan (Patriotic Youth), founded the
NDF after all legal opposition was
banned during Martial Law.
The wide appeal of the NDF and the
NP A are illustrated by two of their
more well known members. Horatio
Morales, jailed in 1982 as chairman of
the NDF, was one of the rising stars of
Philippine public administration. On
the night of December 26, 1977 the
former student leader was to be awarded the Jaycees outstanding young man
Continued on page Four
Page Three
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of the year. But instead he announced
that since "All our well-meaning efforts were in vain ... I decided to join
the NDF. '' Father Conrado Balweg,
the most wanted man in the Northern
island of Luzon, comes from the Tingguian tribal minority and is the highest
known ranking NPA commander. He
joined the NPA when his work to prevent the confiscation of ancestral lands
by a large logging corporation brought
the military after him.

and the Aquino assassination inquiry,
have taken a back seat. Half a year
after the elections, the 59 opposition
assemblymen realize that Marcos is
not about to engage in powersharing
with them. And through a brilliant legal
maneuver, Marcos defused the assassination issue, at least for a while. After
the majority of the Agrava commission
implicated Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver and 24 officers in the
assassination, the case was forwarded
to a special court for possible prosecution. By placing any future prosecution
Due to Marcos 'decree mak- in the hands of the Sandiganbayan, a
ing power over the National low level court used during Martial Law
against political opponents, Marcos
Assembly, the strength of
can delay the proceedings and insure
the opposition lies not with greater protection for his generals.
Due to Marcos' decree making power
the elite opposition in the
over the National Assembly, the
National Assembly, but
strength of the opposition lies not with
with the ''Parliament of
the elite opposition in the National
Assembly, but with the ''Parliament of
the streets'' led by issuethe streets'' led by issue-oriented
oriented organizations.
organizations. After years of careful
organizing work, the opposition can
Move to the left
regularly call out 10,000 disciplined
The collapse of the economic system demonstrators. One example was the
constructed during Martial Law is simultaneous December 1 protests at
polarizing Philippine society and the U.S. Embassy in Manila and Clark
pushing the opposition further left. In airfield. Led by KMU and student
the first quarter of 1984, some 950,000 groups, 10,000 protestors at the Emworkers were laid off due to the debt bassy and 5,000 at the military base
crisis. Unemployment has now reached demanded the end of "U.S. interven400/o while inflation has climbed past tion in Philippine affairs" and the
650/o. According to the IMF's own cal- removal of all U.S. military facilities in
culations, due to its austerity program the Philippines.
and devaluation of the peso, the econAmong the traditional opposition,
omy will contract by 5-60/o in 1985.
What this means in real terms is that the the parliment of the streets is now
middle and working classes will be hit recognized as the center of politics.
again with skyrocketing prices for basic Recently, Cardinal Jaime Sin, head of
commodities while hundreds of thous- the Catholic Church and an advocate of
"national reconciliation," urged parands more lose their jobs.
Workers have not taken the IMF's ishoners to join the street demonstrabitter medicine without protest. Last tions, a move that was seen as an atyear over 268 strikes were staged pro- tempt to ''regain the initiative'' from
testing fixed wages and rising prices. the NDF. Populist assemblyman HoDespite the ban on strikes in ''vital in- mobono Adaza is hopeful that through
dustries," Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU- "the convergence of the parliamentary
May First Movement), a militant trade opposition with the opposition of the
union of over 350,000 members, pre- street ... Marcos can be toppled before
dicts more strikes for 1985. Last 1987."
Moreover, many of the demands inmonth, transport workers, the Nationalist Alliance and student groups led a troduced by the left have also been
four day general strike in Davao which adopted by the elite nationalist oppositotally paralyzed the Philippines' sec- tion. In late December leading political
ond largest city and gave a prelude of personalities signed a "Declaration of
Unity" committing a future Presidenfuture actions.
In the political arena, the two main tial candidate to draw up a new connews events of 1984, the May elections stitution. legalize the CPP, grant
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amnesty for all political prisoners, and
remove the U.S. military bases. Significantly members of the pro-U .S. opposition, Eva Estrada Kalaw and Salvadore
Laurel, refused to sign. Even the very
language of the NDF has been incorporated by no less than Defense
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. Speaking
on the military situation, he warned
that the NP A could reach military parity in two years, or a "strategic stalemate'' - a term not coined by the Pentagon.
The fundamental basis of the Philippine opposition is in the countryside
where the vast majority of the people
live and where human rights abuses
have been the most widespread. By all
acounts, arrest, torture, and extralegal
executions by the military have been on
the rise. And according to Amnesty International, the torture of political detainees is considered ''standard operating procedure.'' Certain branches of
the Philippine military are especially
noted for their propensity towards
violence against the Philippine Constabulary which numbers over 40,000
and the Integrated Civilian Home
Defense Force, a paramilitary force of
65,000 composed primarily of local
toughs.

With guerilla fronts in
over 50 of the Philippines'
73 provinces, NPA strength
has increased so that it now
controls approximately 20%
of all villages.
The operations of the Philippine
military have led to the coining of
several new terms. "Salvaging" refers
to the execution and disfigurement of
unarmed civilians. In "censusing" the
names of the inhabitants of a household are painted on the home. If on a
given day those whose names are listed
are not present, they are considered
''subversives.'' Strategic hamletting
and free fire zones, designed to deny
the NPA popular support, have in
many cases increased resentment
against the military.
Not all experts agree, however, with
this terminology. When questioned in a
rare interview on "salvaging" Ver
responded "What salvaging? I don't
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know what it means. In the NISA [National Intelligence Security Authority]
we use another term - TND - termination and disposal.''
As Pentagon officials readily concede, the increase in military atrocities,
combined with economic injustice, has
contributed to the growing popular appeal of the NP A. From a few numbers
on 1968, the NPA has grown to an estimated 10,000 armed guerrillas, another
10,000 irregulars, with 200,000 active
supporters. With guerrilla fronts in
over 50 of the Philippines' 73 provinces, NP A strength has increased so
that it now controls approximately
200Jo of all villages. Moreover, according to Pentagon officials, the NP A has
"no apparent external support" and its
indigenous nature ''is one of the most
troublesome aspects of the
insurgency.''
The NP A, however, is not only a
fighting force. According to news accounts, above all it is also a political

organization providing services in guerrilla zones. Many NP A members serve
as health care workers, social workers,
agronomists, veterinarians and educators. In these areas rents from absentee
landlords have been suspended and in
some areas land reform has begun.
During the initial stages of the NP A's
growth in the early and mid 1970s, it
was this extensive program of organizing training, and service in the rural
areas which laid the foundation for the
NPA's present expansion. While the
NP A was still vulnerable militarily, the
Muslim separatist Moro National Liberation played a crucial role in pinning
down 850Jo of the Philippine military in
the southern island of Mindanao. Currently, the MNLF and the NP A are
believed to cooperate occasionally on a
tactical level.
Presently, Davao city in Mindanao is
viewed by the Philippine military and
the NP A as something of a ''test-case''
for future operations by both sides. The

countryside surrounding Davao is regarded as a region of especially strong
NPA support. The city itself is the first
area where the NPA has begun urban
operations.
Last July the Philippine military
launched a large series of military
sweeps around Davao, driving hundreds of families out of their homes to
declare large areas "no man's land."
Recently, a new elite counterinsurgency
battalion, which had been training for
over a year, began operations in the
region. The U.S. has stepped up its role
too; speeding the delivery of some 56
VI50 armored vehicles, most of them
destined for Mindanao. Yet, so far, the
increase in material and the new counterinsurgency program do not seem to
have had much of an effect.
According to reports in the Philippine press, the NP A plans to move out
of the present ''strategic defense'' to

Continued on page Seven

Fifty-foot Ma rcos monument outside of Baguio City north of Manila.
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CIA Cultivates Academia
on Philippines

As

the Philippine crisis has intensified, the CIA and other branches of
the executive have turned to academia
for advice on the insurgent New People's Army (NP A). Often under the
guise of legitimate scholarship, the CIA
is increasingly taking advantage of the
independence and credibility of certain
Philippine academicians.
David Rosenberg, Associate Professor of Political Science at Middlebury College has rapidly becpme one
such expert. Over the last two years he
engaged in extensive consulting for the
government and CIA as well as testifying before Congress on how best to
defeat the insurgency. Most recently,
while giving a lecture at Washington's
Asia Society, he described the NP A as
receiving aid from ''left-wing groups,
socialist groups, radical groups in
Western Europe and the U.S. that do
provide publication outlets as well as
some material contributions." Only a
few years ago Professor Rosenberg was
loosely associated with some Philippine
opposition groups in the U.S.
Over the years, Professor Rosenberg
developed close ties with some members of the U .S.-based opposition to the
Marcos government as well as Americans critical of that government. The
editor of Marcos and Martial Law,
Rosenberg was seen by many as a liberal critic who on occasion sponsored
talks by Filipino oppositionists. He
often received information and literature from Philippine opposition groups
that, while not sensitive, was provided
in good faith.
In 1983, however, while on sabbatical at Johns Hopkins School for
Advanced International Studies, Rosenberg began consulting for various
governmental agencies on the Philippine insurgency. Among them were: the
World Bank; the State Department; the
CIA; and International Government
Business Counselors Inc., a private risk
analysis firm with strong CIA connections through its senior partner William
Colby. The main focus of this consulting was on the effect of economic austerity programs on rural instability.
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In May of that year, Rosenberg participated in a conference at Langley
which brought together academicians
on the Philippines with high-level officials from the State Department, National Security Agency, Congressional
Research Service, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the CIA. The conference
at CIA headquarters was closed to the
public and dealt with ''The Rural
Economy and Insurgencies in the
Philippines.''
Aside from Professor Rosenberg,
other Philippine specialists attending
were Justin Green of Villanova University and the noted historian David Joel
Stienberg, Vice President of Brandeis
University. As Rosenberg later told one
observer, the CIA had invited him and
other academicians since they ''wanted
somebody from the outside ... who has
more of an analytical or historical
framework who can try and make sense
of all these pieces [of data] they had."
When Rosenberg subsequently acknowledged the extent of his consulting
work, acquaintances associated with
the U .S.-based Philippine opposition
were widely surprised. But according to
longstanding Friends of the Filipino
People member, Boone Schirmer, in
the Spring of 1984 Rosenberg later
"repented that he had done wrong" to
consult for the CIA. Rosenberg explained that he wanted to see how the
CIA worked from the inside. Among
Filipino and American circles, this
avowed recognition of the morally
dubious character of working for the
CIA was generally accepted as the last
word.
But later, Rosenberg would state that
"under certain circumstances" he
would consult for the CIA again. He
maintained that ''it is important to
separate intelligence activities from
covert operations, some people don't
think it is possible, it may only be a
hope. And if that is the case we need to
make sure we, the academic profession,
have as wide open a debate as possible
as to what is going on in the Philippines, not only to serve the interests of
U.S. foreign policy but to hold our-
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selves accountable to it.'' As for some
fell ow academicians who refused to
work for the CIA on professional or
moral grounds, Rosenberg claimed, "it
only isolates us from whatever responsible influence we may have ... you can
speak truth to power."
Although Rosenberg may have disagreed in private with the powers that be
in the defense and intelligence communities, in Congresional testimony
last September, he argued that for the
U.S. "intervention is inescapable" and
for the Philippine military ''more civic
actions are necessary." To defeat the
insurgency a package of massive
economic aid tied to political and
economic reforms was not sufficient,
he argued, a large training program to
"reprofessionalize" the Philippine
military was also required.
Schirmer expressed the general sense
of betrayal among Philippine activists
that '' A man can make a mistake and
realizing it is a mistake can therefore be
accepted. But to go back and repeat the
same things shows a certain degree of
insincerity.''
In last month's lecture at the Asia
Society, which was meant to ''bridge
the gap between theory and practice,''
Rosenberg spelled out more of his
"agenda" for the Philippines. Regarding human rights abuses and the military's role in the assassination of Senator Aquino, Rosenberg called for a
speedy trial, not so much for justice per
se, but because it "is a very essential
part of any counterinsurgency program
to remove some of the most important
problems with the government which
seem to exacerbate radical reactions."
In addition, he recommended ''more
and more training, especially via !MET
[training in the U.S.], which historically has proved to be a very effective program."
Rosenberg's allegations at the lecture
about "left-wing groups" providing
material aid to the NPS also had troubling implications. If Congress passes
Reagan's proposed legislation on terrorism, some Philippine opposition
groups in the U.S. might be classified as
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''terrorist. , ,
To many academicians and activists,
however, more important than the actions of one individual were the broad
questions raised by the issue of scholars
working for the CIA, whether openly
or not. Steve Shalom, a political science
professor who initiated a letter among
Philippine academicians pledging not
to consult for the CIA said, "it made
me realize that people now feel they can
go back to the world of the 1950s when
one could mention it with pride."
Many believe that this trend of the CIA
offering inducements to academia will
increase commensurate with U.S. intervention in the Philippines.
-Erik Guyvt

Philippines
Continued from page Five
the ''strategic stalemate,,, or rough
military parity by 1987. The strategic
stalemate will be marked by NP A operations in large-sized units and the establishment of several guerrilla bases areas off limits to the Philippine
military. Current NP A operations have
included company-sized units of up to
200 men and over 10 guerilla based
areas have reportedly been established.
U.S. officials are unusually frank in
expressing their concern that the NPA's
prediction may come true. One assistant secretary of defense warned that if
the present trends continue "the balance of power could favor the insurgents within the next several years."
Faced with that prospect, the U.S. is
looking for ways to insure the survival
of the Marcos regime.
The U.S. Moves

The uncomfortable dilemma that
U.S. policy makers now find themselves in is mainly of their own making.
For years the U.S. consistently supported Marcos since he was sole guarantor
of the U.S. bases and U.S. policy was
predicated on maintenance of those
bases. Now, however, with Marcos
perceived as a liability, certain quarters
would prefer to dispose of the liability.
Yet, due to his control over the
military, Marcos has made himself indispensible as the linchpin which holds
the Philippine military together.
The Philippine military is plagued
with poor morale and intense factionalism. In Manila, so-called
"overstaying generals" long past
retirement age, often maneuver for
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political spoils. Meanwhile, morale is
low among junior officers and colonels
relegated to outlying posts where they
see their careers languishing. The main
split in the military is between Marcos'
former bodyguard Gen. Ver and Lt.
Gen. Fidel Ramos who replaced Ramos
as acting chief of staff and is seen as
more of a ''professional.,, In late
November the rift was dramatized
when Ver supporters, in a show of muscle against their acting superior Ramos,
mobilized tanks and troops in Manila
spawning coup rumors.

One assistant secretary

of defense warned that if
the present trends continue
''the balance of power could
favor the insurgents within
the next several years. ''
The U.S. seeks to "professionalize"
the Philippine military through increased training programs and joint maneuvers. Speaking before Congress for a
doubling in present U.S. training programs Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, summed up U.S. goals: "In this
period of change and upheaval in the
Philippines, it is more important than
ever that we strengthen the existing
close personal ties with its younger
military leaders."
Yet the Pentagon must proceed carefully in strengthening these ties without
exacerbating existing tensions within
the military. As one Assistant Secretary
of Defense candidly stated ''we have
relayed our concerns to the responsible
officers ... I talked to some of them but
I do not want to identify them.,,
In the Pentagon's plans to professionalize the military, a key actor will
certainly be the West Point trained
Ramos. With Ramos in place as -chief
of staff, Pentagon officials can argue
that the Philippine military is being
reformed: Ver, the corrupt general
associated with Marcos and implicated
in the assassination, was removed and a
professional has been installed. While
Ramos, a veteran of Vietnam and
Korea, may have a better image, many
observers point out that Ramos is a
strong loyalist to his second cousin Marcos - and played a key role in instituting Martial Law. Moreover, as
commander of the Philippine Constabulary, Ramos has line command
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responsibility over the military unit
most notorious for human rights
abuses.
The next two years will be crucial as
the strength of the Philippine opposition movement grows and the U.S.
escalates it military commitments to
Marcos. For the vast majority of
Filipinos, their opposition movement
holds greater promise after 13 years of
dictatorship. Yet unless anti-interventionist, human rights and disarmament
groups organize around the Philippines, the following conversation will
become all the more common.
A few months ago, a Filipino human
rights activist confronted a powerful
congressional aide with local press accounts about uniformed U.S. military
advisors participating in a large
counterinsurgency campaign in his province. Instead of denying it, the aid
justified the presence of "observers"
claiming "There's too much at stake
for us to not have a man in the field."

Erik Guyot is the Co-Director of the
Congressional Liaison Unit of the
Philippine Support Committee. For
more information please write to:
Philippine Support Committee, 1346
Connecticut Ave. NW, Room 533,
Washington, De 20036.
•one of the best works on militarization
and Martial Law is "Militarization:
Philippines" by P.N. Abina/es, Nationalist Resource Center, 1982,
Manila.
2
Development Debacle: The World
Bank in the Philippines, Bello, Kinley,
Elinson, Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1982, provides one of
the most complete case studies of the
workinf! of the World Bank.
The Resist Pledge System

The most important source of Resist's
income is monthly pledges. Pledges
help us plan ahead by guaranteeing us
a minimum monthly income. In turn,
pledges receive a monthly reminder letter (in addition to the newsletter) which
contains news of recent grants and
other Resist activities. So take the
plunge and become a Resist pledge!
Yes, I would like to pledge S
monthly to the work of Resist.
Name _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
City _ _ _ State __ Zip _ _ __
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The Nerve Center, 2327 Webster St.,

Berkeley, CA 94705
The Nerve Center, a resource Center
for disarmament organizers and the
general public, focuses on chemical and
biological warfare. Their work has
developed out of a growing awareness
of two facts: first, that chemical and
biological weapons themselves pose a
direct and increasing threat to the safety of all people; second, that renewed
interest in chemical and biological warfare may actually make nuclear war
more likely. When the group was
formed in 1982 the Reagan administration was attempting, with its binary
nerve gas program, to break a long
moratorium on the production of lethal
chemical weapons. At the same time, in
the Pentagon, strategists were rewriting
U.S. military doctrine, evolving new
plans which presume the offensive use
of both chemical and nuclear weapons
in any possible future war in Europe.
The immediate purpose of the Center is
to urge the peace and disarmament
movement to work actively against
chemical and biological weapons. In
order to support that aim, they are initiating two projects. One is a special
nationwide campaign to inform the
public about dangers of the binary
nerve gas program. The other is publication of a regular quarterly newsletter
covering a much broader range of
issues, titled UNMASK. In December
1983, they wrote and designed a
brochure on the binary program and
with assistance from Resist, printed
3,000. Resist's recent grant went
towards the next issue of UNMASK.
Julie Community Center, 2001

E.
Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21231
The Julie Community Center is a
community-based and controlled
organization in an economically
deprived area of Baltimore. Since 1977
this area, which is three-fourths of a
mile from Center City Baltimore and its
Inner Harbor, has been undergoing
reinvestment displacement, i.e., the
uprooting of low-income residents
from their homes as property values
rise and professional, middle-income
persons are attracted to the neighborhood. The Center's goal is to develop
strong self-reliant neighborhoods in its
area by offering the support necessary
for community groups to come together to define their needs and to act to
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achieve them. The constituency of the
Center are low-income persons and
families who lack ownership of and/ or
access to needed resources to control
their own lives and to impact the decisions which affect their lives. The special
foci of the Center are housing, health
care, and people's rights advocacy. A
cultural dimension is also fostered
through art classes, encouragement of
crafts and celebrative activities. One
off-shoot of the Center is the Concerned Citizens of Butchers Hill, Inc., a
low-income group of tenants who were
threatened with displacement from
their homes in 1977. As a result of the
efforts of the Center, they now own
and manage the 10 houses, 31 units in
which they live. Another off-shoot,
Our Neighborhood Effort in Housing,
now owns seven houses and consists of
30 families. Presently, the Center continues to work around issues of
displacement, housing and empowerment. Resist's grant went towards the
purchase of a Panasonic video tape
deck that will be used to show locally
produced videos at block meetings in
the neighborhood and will be shared by
other community groups in the area.
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community organizations and local
chapters of national organizations take
on the campaigns. Resist's grant went
towards the cost of a new computer /word processor which will enable
MADRE to reach more people and
spend more time out in the field
developing new projects.
Other Recent Grants
Blacks Against Nukes,

3728 N. Hampshire Ave., NW 202,
Washington, DC 20010.
Indigenous People's Network,

PO Box 384, Rochester, VT 05767.
Nuclear XChange,4649 Sunnyside Ave.

Seattle, WA 98103.
Symphony Tenants Organizing Project,

58 Burbank St., PO Box 577,
Boston, MA 02123.
Child Care Employee Project,

PO Box 5603, Berkeley, CA 94705.

CORRECTION: We neglected to note
that the two remarkable photos in the
last issue of the newsletter are credited
to Paul Hutchcroft of the Philippine
Support Committee.

Madre, 853 Broadway, Rm 905, NY,
NY 10003

Madre is a friendship association between women in the U.S. and women in
Central America and the Caribbean.
Madre's purpose is to stop U.S. intervention in Central America and the
Caribbean by developing an exchange
between people here and there. It has
established a number of campaigns to
that end, and has met with an extraordinarily positive response. The programs include one-to-one correspondence, ''twinning'' of daycare centers,
and major material aid campaigns. The
approach provides individuals . and
organizations with a positive, concrete
way to become involved, register concern and opposition to U.S. intervention, and actually participate in an effort which offers real support to those
most affected by the U.S. policies. As
part of its ongoing programmatic
work, MADRE conducts a media campaign and has received attention in a
number of major publications as well as
on television news and on radio.
MADRE has also developed local
"Friends of MADRE" groups
throughout the country. In addition,
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